The International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD) is the United Nations’ flagship high-level forum on how the world finances sustainable development. Starting with the 2002 Monterrey Conference, followed by Doha in 2008 and Addis Ababa in 2015, this year’s edition marked the fourth major installment in the FfD process.
It brought together governments, international financial institutions, private sector actors, and civil society to build consensus on the policies, institutions, and reforms needed to mobilize finance effectively—covering everything from debt and domestic revenue to private investment, digital infrastructure, and multilateral governance.
Unlike forums such as the G7, G20, or OECD which represent only a subset of countries, FfD is the only global platform where all nations participate on an equal footing, giving voice to the perspectives and priorities of developing countries. For Africa in particular, the FfD serves as a vital arena to push for a more equitable and effective global financial architecture.
African Priorities at FfD4
Going into the conference, five main issues were on the continent’s agenda:
Debt Sustainability and Crisis Finance
Reforming the Global Financial Architecture to Serve Development
Domestic Resource Mobilization and Global Tax Justice
Private Sector Investment, and Trade for Development
Data, Digital Infrastructure and Knowledge Systems
PCAD looks at the extent to which these issues are addressed by the Sevilla Commitment (Comprimiso de Sevilla).
Note to reader: This piece only analyses the outcome document (Sevilla Commitment) adopted by Member States. There will be a follow-up piece on the Sevilla Platform for Action and the role of development actors at the global and domestic levels in implementing the Commitment.
1. Debt Sustainability and Crisis Finance
Core Problem: African countries are trapped in unsustainable debt cycles and lack timely, fair access to emergency finance when crises hit.
Many African countries are caught in deepening debt distress. Over half are either in or at high risk of default, with debt service consuming a growing share of national budgets and diverting resources from health, education, and infrastructure. Recent shocks including the COVID-19 pandemic, climate-related disasters, and surging global interest rates have worsened the situation.
Much of this debt is external, denominated in foreign currencies, and owed to a fragmented mix of creditors, particularly private bondholders who are difficult to coordinate. Existing mechanisms like the G20 Common Framework are slow, uncertain, and ineffective at enforcing fair burden-sharing, especially from private lenders. IMF instruments, meanwhile, are often slow and tied to austerity conditions that deepen hardship.
At the heart of the matter is a structural problem: African countries are trapped in unsustainable debt cycles and lack timely, fair access to emergency finance when crises hit. This imbalance constrains fiscal sovereignty and prevents countries from pursuing self-defined development pathways.
Key statistics
In 2024, Africa received US$42 billion in Official Development Assistance. In contrast, US$163 billion went out in debt payments
Africa is devoting only ~4 % of GDP to education and ~7 % of its public spending to health, despite sensitive human development needs.
More than 43% of African external debt is owed to private creditors
Africa's ask:
Timely and fair debt restructuring, including private creditor participation and legal safeguards against predatory holdouts.
Greater debt transparency to improve borrower and creditor coordination and accountability during sovereign debt restructuring process.
Use of state-contingent debt instruments to ease fiscal pressure during shocks (including suspension of repayments in such periods).
Broader access to emergency liquidity, including the rechanneling of unused SDRs through Multilateral Banks, including the African Development Bank, through its Hybrid Capital Instrument.
The establishment of a UN Framework Convention on Debt.
The Africa’s Union Lome Declaration on Africa’s debt highlighted the need to create a more comprehensive, fair, and effective multilateral mechanism for preventing and resolving sovereign debt crises.
The vast majority of countries in the world support the establishment of a Framework Convention on Sovereign Debt as a legally binding mechanism to guide timely and adequate debt relief: inclusive and transparent, propose development-oriented debt sustainability assessments, address illegitimate debt, and propose debt crisis prevention mechanisms.
Sevilla Commitment
The outcome document includes modest improvements on debt sustainability, such as acknowledging the need for legal frameworks to facilitate private creditor participation. It also recognizes state-contingent debt instruments and supports transparency. However, these reflect long-standing technical consensus, not political breakthroughs. There are no binding commitments or new mechanisms to guarantee timely and fair debt resolution. In fact, language referencing non-cooperative private creditors and scaled-up access to IMF liquidity was removed.
Most significantly, the outcome document fails to address Africa’s call for structural transformation of the debt architecture. The request for a UN-led intergovernmental process for establishment of UN Debt Framework convention on Debt was watered down, and there is no support for regional liquidity facilities, and no mention of counter-cyclical finance tools. While the tone has improved, the power structures remain untouched.
2. Reforming the Global Financial Architecture to Serve Development
Core Problem: African countries' access to affordable long-term finance is structurally constrained by an inequitable global financial system that it cannot meaningfully influence.
Closely tied to the issue of debt is the broader question of global financial governance. Africa’s ability to secure long-term, affordable financing is constrained by an international system it did not design. From the IMF and World Bank to global credit rating agencies, the institutions and rules that govern the flow of capital reflect historical imbalances that privilege the Global North.
African countries face disproportionately high borrowing costs, despite having lower default rates than many high-income peers. Credit rating agencies apply opaque and pro-cyclical assessments that inflate risk and cost. Meanwhile, concessional finance is shrinking, particularly for lower-middle-income countries, and capital flows are often short-term and volatile.
Africa’s voice in global financial decision-making remains marginal. Without meaningful representation and decision-making power, the continent remains a policy taker—subject to rules that often work against its development interests.
Key statistics
While African countries account for over 50% of IMFs debt, it controls only 6.5% of voting power. Same under-representation applies to the World Bank (11% voting power compared to more than 30% debt-holding)
In the last 5 years, the average bond yield for African sovereigns was 9.8% compared to <1% for advanced economies like Germany
Developing countries, including those in Africa, pay roughly 5 percentage points more in borrowing costs than peers due to credit rating biases
Africa's ask:
Expanded access to concessional finance, including for lower-middle-income countries.
Rechanneling of SDRs to African-led regional liquidity facilities.
Strengthening regional development banks like AfDB.
Creation of credit enhancement tools to lower sovereign risk premiums.
Structural reform of the IMF and World Bank to ensure equitable governance.
Reform of credit rating agencies to ensure transparency and development-sensitive criteria.
Enforceable global rules on capital flow regulation to stabilize markets and protect policy space.
The African Union is working to establish the African Credit Rating Agency (AfCRA) by September 2025 to offer credit ratings that reflect Africa’s unique contexts and address long-standing biases in international rating systems. The agency aims to promote financial sovereignty and integration by developing a more accurate, context-sensitive approach to assessing countries' economic, fiscal, and political conditions.
Sevilla Commitment
The Sevilla Commitment acknowledges some of Africa’s concerns such as the need for inclusive representation in global institutions and better regulation of credit ratings and capital flows. However, its language is vague, non-binding, and avoids specific structural proposals. The Commitment drops references to IMF quota reform found in earlier drafts and weakens language on SDRs, stripping out earlier suggestions that rechanneling them could support long-term development and regional liquidity mechanisms.
In doing so, it steps back from even the modest ambition of earlier drafts. The Commitment echoes Africa’s development goals rhetorically, but leaves intact the very systems that undermine them. Without concrete actions, the structural inequalities at the heart of global finance remain unchanged.
3. Domestic Resource Mobilization and Global Tax Justice
Core Problem: Africa struggles to raise sufficient and fair domestic revenues due to weak tax systems, corporate tax abuse, and limited enforcement capacity.
Africa’s ability to finance its development is not just about accessing international finance, it also depends on what it can raise domestically. Yet most African tax systems are narrow, regressive, and overly reliant on indirect taxes that disproportionately affect the poor. Meanwhile, multinational corporations exploit legal loopholes and weak enforcement to avoid taxes, especially in extractive, digital, and telecom sectors.
Massive revenue losses occur annually through illicit financial flows, profit shifting, and harmful tax incentives. These are enabled by global financial secrecy jurisdictions and an international tax architecture dominated by the OECD, where African voices are not represented.
Key statistics
Africa’s annual losses due to IFFs total around $88.6 billion; approximately $40 billion in the extractive sector alone
Multinational mining companies cost African governments US $450–730 million annually in lost corporate tax revenue
Africa's ask:
Progressive tax reform to broaden and fairly distribute the tax base.
Curbing illicit flows through stronger enforcement and renegotiated treaties.
Building digital tax capacity and transfer pricing enforcement.
A new global tax body under the UN to replace OECD dominance.
Public country-by-country reporting and unitary taxation rules.
Sevilla Commitment
The Sevilla Commitment acknowledges issues like illicit financial flows and tax capacity. Notably, while it acknowledges the ongoing UN process on tax cooperation, it stops well short of endorsing the creation of an intergovernmental UN tax body which was a central African demand aimed at rebalancing power away from the OECD-dominated system. It also fails to commit to key reforms like unitary taxation or public corporate reporting. As with other issues, it names the problem but avoids shifting the global rules that enable it.
4. Private Sector Investment and Trade for Development
Core Problem: Private investment in Africa is insufficient, narrowly concentrated, and poorly aligned with long-term development goals.
While private investment is often promoted as the solution to development finance, in Africa it remains insufficient, volatile, and narrowly focused on extractives and speculative ventures. Most investments are not aligned with national development plans or structural transformation goals.
African governments lack the tools or leverage to direct private capital toward inclusive development. De-risking instruments often serve to protect investors rather than public interests and trade agreements can restrict policy space needed for industrialization.
Key Statistics
Only 15 African countries received 80% of total FDI in the past decade
Africa needs US$130–170 billion annually just for infrastructure
Africa's ask:
Investment aligned with national development strategies and job creation.
Reform of de-risking tools to ensure developmental impact.
Support for productive sectors such as manufacturing, agribusiness, and digital.
Trade agreements that preserve policy space and support local industries.
Sevilla Commitment
The Commitment includes references to aligning investment with national priorities and promoting inclusive industrialization. However, it fails to address the issue private capital flowing into short-term, low-impact ventures. It also avoids highlighting the impacts of existing trade and investment agreements that constrain Africa’s policy options.
5. data, digital infrastructure, and knowledge systems
Core Problem: Africa lacks control over the data, digital infrastructure, and knowledge systems that increasingly shape development decisions, financial flows, and technological innovation.
Africa’s development will be increasingly shaped by data, digital platforms, and knowledge systems that are governed by external actors. From statistical systems and fintech to AI and cloud infrastructure, the continent lacks ownership over digital infrastructure and the data that fuels innovation and financial flows.
Most digital services are dominated by foreign platforms operating under extractive models. Furthermore, national capacities to collect, govern, and use data for policy and accountability remain weak. Intellectual property regimes also limit the sharing of technology and the growth of local innovation ecosystems.
Key Statistics
Africa holds less than 1% of the world’s total data center capacity
A handful of global tech conglomerates control over 90% of digital revenue and platform profits in African markets
Africa's ask:
Stronger national data systems and public digital infrastructure.
Data sovereignty and fair taxation of digital services.
Technology transfer, open-source innovation, and digital skills.
Regional research hubs and inclusive participation in tech governance.
Sevilla Commitment
The Sevilla Commitment mentions digital infrastructure and statistical capacity, but treats these as technical support issues rather than matters of sovereignty. It avoids structural proposals on digital value chains, data ownership, or reform of global intellectual property rules. Without addressing these deeper dynamics, Africa risks remaining a provider of raw digital inputs and not a co-creator of the digital future.
CONCLUSION
The Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development was a rare opportunity to advance bold reforms at a time when the world and Africa in particular, needs them most. Across debt, international financial architecture, taxation, investment, and digital sovereignty, African countries presented concrete proposals grounded in the urgency of their realities and the ambition of their aspirations.
The Sevilla Commitment, however, has done little to shift the imbalances that keep African countries on the margins of global finance. Understandably, the FfD4 took place against the backdrop of geopolitical tensions and concerns over the future of multilateralism. In this sense, the existence of a Commitment is by itself, a laudable achievement. That being said, a lot of work still lies ahead if rhetoric is to be accompanied by real action.
Debt, Development, and Dependency: Africa’s Test at FfD4
The International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD) is the United Nations’ flagship high-level forum on how the world finances sustainable development. Starting with the 2002 Monterrey Conference, followed by Doha in 2008 and Addis Ababa in 2015, this year’s edition marked the fourth major installment in the FfD process.
It brought together governments, international financial institutions, private sector actors, and civil society to build consensus on the policies, institutions, and reforms needed to mobilize finance effectively—covering everything from debt and domestic revenue to private investment, digital infrastructure, and multilateral governance.
Unlike forums such as the G7, G20, or OECD which represent only a subset of countries, FfD is the only global platform where all nations participate on an equal footing, giving voice to the perspectives and priorities of developing countries. For Africa in particular, the FfD serves as a vital arena to push for a more equitable and effective global financial architecture.
African Priorities at FfD4
Going into the conference, five main issues were on the continent’s agenda:
PCAD looks at the extent to which these issues are addressed by the Sevilla Commitment (Comprimiso de Sevilla).
Note to reader: This piece only analyses the outcome document (Sevilla Commitment) adopted by Member States. There will be a follow-up piece on the Sevilla Platform for Action and the role of development actors at the global and domestic levels in implementing the Commitment.
1. Debt Sustainability and Crisis Finance
Many African countries are caught in deepening debt distress. Over half are either in or at high risk of default, with debt service consuming a growing share of national budgets and diverting resources from health, education, and infrastructure. Recent shocks including the COVID-19 pandemic, climate-related disasters, and surging global interest rates have worsened the situation.
Much of this debt is external, denominated in foreign currencies, and owed to a fragmented mix of creditors, particularly private bondholders who are difficult to coordinate. Existing mechanisms like the G20 Common Framework are slow, uncertain, and ineffective at enforcing fair burden-sharing, especially from private lenders. IMF instruments, meanwhile, are often slow and tied to austerity conditions that deepen hardship.
At the heart of the matter is a structural problem: African countries are trapped in unsustainable debt cycles and lack timely, fair access to emergency finance when crises hit. This imbalance constrains fiscal sovereignty and prevents countries from pursuing self-defined development pathways.
Key statistics
Africa's ask:
Sevilla Commitment
The outcome document includes modest improvements on debt sustainability, such as acknowledging the need for legal frameworks to facilitate private creditor participation. It also recognizes state-contingent debt instruments and supports transparency. However, these reflect long-standing technical consensus, not political breakthroughs. There are no binding commitments or new mechanisms to guarantee timely and fair debt resolution. In fact, language referencing non-cooperative private creditors and scaled-up access to IMF liquidity was removed.
Most significantly, the outcome document fails to address Africa’s call for structural transformation of the debt architecture. The request for a UN-led intergovernmental process for establishment of UN Debt Framework convention on Debt was watered down, and there is no support for regional liquidity facilities, and no mention of counter-cyclical finance tools. While the tone has improved, the power structures remain untouched.
2. Reforming the Global Financial Architecture to Serve Development
Closely tied to the issue of debt is the broader question of global financial governance. Africa’s ability to secure long-term, affordable financing is constrained by an international system it did not design. From the IMF and World Bank to global credit rating agencies, the institutions and rules that govern the flow of capital reflect historical imbalances that privilege the Global North.
African countries face disproportionately high borrowing costs, despite having lower default rates than many high-income peers. Credit rating agencies apply opaque and pro-cyclical assessments that inflate risk and cost. Meanwhile, concessional finance is shrinking, particularly for lower-middle-income countries, and capital flows are often short-term and volatile.
Africa’s voice in global financial decision-making remains marginal. Without meaningful representation and decision-making power, the continent remains a policy taker—subject to rules that often work against its development interests.
Key statistics
Africa's ask:
Sevilla Commitment
The Sevilla Commitment acknowledges some of Africa’s concerns such as the need for inclusive representation in global institutions and better regulation of credit ratings and capital flows. However, its language is vague, non-binding, and avoids specific structural proposals. The Commitment drops references to IMF quota reform found in earlier drafts and weakens language on SDRs, stripping out earlier suggestions that rechanneling them could support long-term development and regional liquidity mechanisms.
In doing so, it steps back from even the modest ambition of earlier drafts. The Commitment echoes Africa’s development goals rhetorically, but leaves intact the very systems that undermine them. Without concrete actions, the structural inequalities at the heart of global finance remain unchanged.
3. Domestic Resource Mobilization and Global Tax Justice
Africa’s ability to finance its development is not just about accessing international finance, it also depends on what it can raise domestically. Yet most African tax systems are narrow, regressive, and overly reliant on indirect taxes that disproportionately affect the poor. Meanwhile, multinational corporations exploit legal loopholes and weak enforcement to avoid taxes, especially in extractive, digital, and telecom sectors.
Massive revenue losses occur annually through illicit financial flows, profit shifting, and harmful tax incentives. These are enabled by global financial secrecy jurisdictions and an international tax architecture dominated by the OECD, where African voices are not represented.
Key statistics
Africa's ask:
Sevilla Commitment
The Sevilla Commitment acknowledges issues like illicit financial flows and tax capacity. Notably, while it acknowledges the ongoing UN process on tax cooperation, it stops well short of endorsing the creation of an intergovernmental UN tax body which was a central African demand aimed at rebalancing power away from the OECD-dominated system. It also fails to commit to key reforms like unitary taxation or public corporate reporting. As with other issues, it names the problem but avoids shifting the global rules that enable it.
4. Private Sector Investment and Trade for Development
While private investment is often promoted as the solution to development finance, in Africa it remains insufficient, volatile, and narrowly focused on extractives and speculative ventures. Most investments are not aligned with national development plans or structural transformation goals.
African governments lack the tools or leverage to direct private capital toward inclusive development. De-risking instruments often serve to protect investors rather than public interests and trade agreements can restrict policy space needed for industrialization.
Key Statistics
Africa's ask:
Sevilla Commitment
The Commitment includes references to aligning investment with national priorities and promoting inclusive industrialization. However, it fails to address the issue private capital flowing into short-term, low-impact ventures. It also avoids highlighting the impacts of existing trade and investment agreements that constrain Africa’s policy options.
5. data, digital infrastructure, and knowledge systems
Africa’s development will be increasingly shaped by data, digital platforms, and knowledge systems that are governed by external actors. From statistical systems and fintech to AI and cloud infrastructure, the continent lacks ownership over digital infrastructure and the data that fuels innovation and financial flows.
Most digital services are dominated by foreign platforms operating under extractive models. Furthermore, national capacities to collect, govern, and use data for policy and accountability remain weak. Intellectual property regimes also limit the sharing of technology and the growth of local innovation ecosystems.
Key Statistics
Africa's ask:
Sevilla Commitment
The Sevilla Commitment mentions digital infrastructure and statistical capacity, but treats these as technical support issues rather than matters of sovereignty. It avoids structural proposals on digital value chains, data ownership, or reform of global intellectual property rules. Without addressing these deeper dynamics, Africa risks remaining a provider of raw digital inputs and not a co-creator of the digital future.
CONCLUSION
The Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development was a rare opportunity to advance bold reforms at a time when the world and Africa in particular, needs them most. Across debt, international financial architecture, taxation, investment, and digital sovereignty, African countries presented concrete proposals grounded in the urgency of their realities and the ambition of their aspirations.
The Sevilla Commitment, however, has done little to shift the imbalances that keep African countries on the margins of global finance. Understandably, the FfD4 took place against the backdrop of geopolitical tensions and concerns over the future of multilateralism. In this sense, the existence of a Commitment is by itself, a laudable achievement. That being said, a lot of work still lies ahead if rhetoric is to be accompanied by real action.